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Abstract The Internet is an important focus of attention for the philosophy of mind
and cognitive science communities. This is partly because the Internet serves as an
important part of the material environment in which a broad array of human cog-
nitive and epistemic activities are situated. The Internet can thus be seen as an
important part of the ‘cognitive ecology’ that helps to shape, support and (on
occasion) realize aspects of human cognizing. Much of the previous philosophical
work in this area has sought to analyze the cognitive significance of the Internet
from the perspective of human cognition. There has, as such, been little effort to
assess the cognitive significance of the Internet from the perspective of ‘machine
cognition’. This is unfortunate, because the Internet is likely to exert a significant
influence on the shape of machine intelligence. The present paper attempts to
evaluate the extent to which the Internet serves as a form of cognitive ecology for
synthetic (machine-based) forms of intelligence. In particular, the phenomenon of
Internet-situated machine intelligence is analyzed from the perspective of a number
of approaches that are typically subsumed under the heading of situated cognition.
These include extended, embedded, scaffolded and embodied approaches to cog-
nition. For each of these approaches, the Internet is shown to be of potential rele-
vance to the development and operation of machine-based cognitive capabilities.
Such insights help us to appreciate the role of the Internet in advancing the current
state-of-the-art in machine intelligence.
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1 Introduction
Over the past two decades the Internet1 has emerged as an important part of the
material environment in which an ever-expanding array of human cognitive and
epistemic activities are situated. This makes the Internet a system of considerable
importance to the philosophy of mind and cognitive science communities. Fueled by
developments in wireless technology and the emergence of a plethora of Internet-
enabled devices (e.g., smartphones), the Internet has arguably become a critical
element of our cognitively-relevant environment or ‘cognitive ecology’. Many kinds
of cognitive tasks, not to mention an increasing number of social activities, rely on
the Internet at one point or another, and this makes the Internet a critical focus of
attention for those who see environmental (i.e., extra-neural and extra-organismic)
factors as playing an explanatorily-significant role in human cognizing (e.g., Clark
2008).
The idea that we should view the Internet as a form of cognitive ecology is
inspired by so-called ecological approaches to cognition (Bateson 1972; Malafouris
2013; Hutchins 2010; Tribble and Sutton 2011; Neisser 1997; Cooke et al. 2004;
Hirose 2002; Barrett 2011). These approaches emphasize the role of the extra-neural
environment in shaping, supporting, and perhaps even realizing human cognitive
states and processes. Hutchins (2010), for example, embraces an ecological
approach to cognition when he suggests that our attempt to understand ‘‘cognitive
phenomena must include a consideration of the environments in which cognitive
processes develop and operate’’ (p. 706). In the absence of this sort of wider
‘ecological’ analysis, Hutchins fears that we may lose sight of the forces and factors
that undergird our (human) cognitive capabilities. In this respect, Hutchins
expresses a view that is broadly consistent with approaches that are typically
subsumed under the heading of situated cognition (Robbins and Aydede 2009a).
A number of bodies of existing work (spread across a range of disciplines) appeal
to the idea that the Internet serves as a form of cognitive ecology for human
cognition. The idea has perhaps its most explicit expression in a paper by Smart
et al. (forthcoming). In this case, the appeal to a cognitive ecological conceptu-
alization of the Internet is used to motivate a situated approach to the analysis of
human-Internet interactions. In particular, Smart et al. (forthcoming) seek to assess
the cognitive significance of the Internet by viewing human-Internet interactions
from the perspective of extended (Clark 2008; Clark and Chalmers 1998),
embedded (Rupert 2004, 2009), embodied (Shapiro 2007, 2011, 2014; Anderson
2003), and collective/distributed (Theiner 2014; Theiner et al. 2010; Hutchins
2001, 1995) approaches to cognition. Similar sorts of analyses are provided by a
1 The term ‘Internet’ is used to refer to the global system of information and communication networks
that rely on Internet communication protocols to achieve end-to-end data transfer. For the purposes of the
present paper, the term ‘Internet’ is used as a convenient way of referring to all the various applications
that are built on top of the Internet protocol suite. These include the World Wide Web (or Web), which
relies on the use of a specific protocol, namely, HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP). The term is also
used to refer to a number of other applications, including email, peer-to-peer networking, the Internet of
Things and so on.
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growing body of work in philosophy and cognitive science (Staley 2014; Halpin
2013; Halpin et al. 2010; Smart 2012, 2013, 2014, forthcoming; Clowes 2015).
Despite the fact that the Internet is an increasingly popular target of philosophical
analysis, there is one respect in which the existing literature is somewhat lacking.
This shortcoming relates to the almost exclusive focus on human cognition. Such a
focus is, of course, understandable given the nature of our interaction with (and
increasing dependence upon) the contemporary Internet. The focus is, however,
unfortunate, because there is considerable evidence to suggest that the Internet is
poised to exert a significant influence on machine-based cognitive capabilities.2 We
can get a feel for the nature of this influence by reflecting on the way in which the
Internet has influenced research into machine learning and Artificial Intelligence
(AI). We thus see increasing amounts of research devoted to cognitive computing
systems (Hurwitz et al. 2015; Kelly and Hamm 2013), deep learning algorithms
(Najafabadi et al. 2015), big data analytics (Hurwitz et al. 2015; O’Leary 2013), the
Semantic Web (Berners-Lee et al. 2001), and so on. The Internet has also spawned a
renewed interest in the familiar idea of human–machine symbiosis (e.g., Licklider
1960; Jacucci et al. 2014) where human and machine capabilities are factored into
hybrid processing loops that span the biological and technological domains. Such
interest is evidenced by the recent explosion of research into ‘human-in-the-loop’
systems (Branson et al. 2014), game-powered machine learning systems (Barring-
ton et al. 2012), human computation systems (Law and von Ahn 2011; Michelucci
2013), citizen science platforms (Khatib et al. 2011a) and Internet-enabled forms of
collective intelligence (Michelucci and Dickinson 2016). This efflorescence of
research relating to Internet-enabled forms of machine intelligence is largely
overlooked by existing attempts to assess the cognitive significance of the Internet.
And yet, when it comes to cognitive capabilities, it seems that the Internet is likely
to be just as relevant to machine cognition as it is to human cognition (perhaps even
more so).
In view of all this, I suggest that we should see the Internet as an environment
that is relevant to the cognitive capabilities of both human and machine agents. Such
a view encourages us to assess the cognitive impacts of the Internet from the
conceptual standpoint of situated cognition (Robbins and Aydede 2009b).3 In what
follows, therefore, I will seek to explore the way in which the notions of extended,
embedded, scaffolded, and embodied cognition can be used to help us gain a better
understanding of online or Internet-situated forms of machine intelligence.4 Not
2 I will assume that at least some forms of machine-based processing activity can be viewed as bona fide
forms of cognitive processing. The current interest in cognitive computing systems (Hurwitz et al. 2015;
Kelly and Hamm 2013; Modha et al. 2011) is testament to the fact that at least some forms of machine-
based processing can be (and typically are) viewed in cognitive terms.
3 This is because a situated approach to cognition enables us to focus on the role of the extra-organismic
and extra-neural environment (i.e., the cognitive ecology) in shaping the cognitive capabilities of the
biological or (in this case) the technological agent.
4 It should be noted that this review is not exhaustive, in the sense that it does not attempt to consider a
number of other forms of cognition that could be subsumed under the banner of situated cognition. There
is, in particular, no attempt to cover the considerable body of work relating to enactive cognition (Stewart
et al. 2010; Engel et al. 2016; Froese et al. 2011), grounded cognition (Barsalou 2008, 2010; Pezzulo
et al. 2013; Pecher and Zwaan 2005) and collective/distributed cognition (Hutchins 1995). It should be
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only does this approach help to establish an important and interesting parallel with
work that focuses almost exclusively on human agents, it also helps, I suggest, to
reveal a number of important directions for research that spans the disciplines of
computer, cognitive and social science (see Sect. 7).
The structure of the present paper is organized around the topics of extended,
embedded, scaffolded and embodied cognition. Section 2 introduces the notion of
extended cognition (Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2008; Menary 2010) and
applies it to the specific case of Internet-situated forms of machine intelligence. The
result is a claim about the potential role of the Internet in supporting a novel form of
cognitive extension. In particular, it is suggested that the Internet enables the human
social environment to be incorporated into the processing loops that realize
machine-based cognitive capabilities. Section 3 assesses the cognitive impacts of
the Internet from the perspective of embedded cognition (Rupert 2004, 2009). In
this case, human agents are seen to play an important role in shaping and supporting
machine-based cognitive capabilities, without thereby serving as constituent
elements of the physical machinery that realizes those capabilities. Section 4
extends the analysis to the case of scaffolded cognition (Sterelny 2010). Scaffolded
cognition is presented as the idea that extra-agential resources (i.e., physical
elements that exist as part of an agent’s environment) can play an important role in
the development of cognitive capabilities. When applied to the case of machine
cognition, it is claimed that the Internet enables human agents to play an important
role in scaffolding the development of machine-based cognitive capabilities.
Section 5 attempts to assess the cognitive significance and relevance of the Internet
from the perspective of embodied cognition (Shapiro 2011, 2014). In this case, it is
suggested that we can see the Internet as enabling the human social environment, as
well as ever-increasing array of Internet-enabled devices, to function as literal body
parts. Finally, Sect. 6 discusses the extent to which human-Internet interactions can
be seen as a form of ‘ecological engineering’ (Sterelny 2003) or ‘cognitive niche
construction’ (Clark 2008). The basic idea, in this case, is that we can see the
Internet as a means of enabling humanity to play a productive role in the creation
and configuration of a cognitively-potent online environment, one that is poised to
shape the profile of both human and machine cognition.
2 Extended Cognition
The term ‘extended cognition’ identifies an important and influential body of work
within the philosophy of mind (see Clark 2008). At its core is the claim that the
causally-active physical vehicles of cognition can, at least in principle, extend
Footnote 4 continued
clear that the Internet is relevant to at least some of these additional forms of situated cognition. When it
comes to collective/distributed cognition, for example, the Internet provides the basis for cognitively-
potent forms of ‘social’ interaction and engagement between collections of purely synthetic agents. This
can be seen as a potential boon for research that goes under the heading of distributed AI (see Clearwater
et al. 1992).
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beyond the biological borders of the individual to include a range of extra-
organismic resources (Clark 2008; Clark and Chalmers 1998).
Although the notion of extended cognition is intended to challenge our bio- and
neuro-centric intuitions (and prejudices) regarding the material bases of intelli-
gence, there is a sense in which the existing philosophical debate remains skewed
towards the biological realm. We see this in the way in which practically all
discussions of extended cognition limit their attention to the case of human (or at
least biological) intelligence. In the majority of cases, therefore, what emerges as
the central focus of philosophical debate is the issue of whether human cognition is
materially extended as a result of some form of bio-artefactual or bio-technological
bonding. This focus is, of course, understandable, given the inherent interest in
explaining the rather distinctive forms of cognitive success that are the hallmark of
our species. It is, however, a focus that is challenged by the increasing
sophistication of machine learning systems and cognitive computing platforms.
And it is further challenged, I would argue, once we situate machine intelligence
within the cognitive ecology of the Internet.
The idea that I want to canvass here is called Human-Extended Machine
Cognition (HEMC). As its name suggests, HEMC is a form of extended cognition.
However, rather than being centered on an individual human agent, HEMC is a form
of extended cognition that is centered on a synthetic intelligent system. HEMC is, in
essence, the idea of materially-extended machine cognition. In particular, it is a
form of extended cognition in which the relevant information processing loops
extend beyond the realms of machine-based computational processing to include the
contributions of one or more human agents. Whereas conventional cases of
extended cognition oblige us to focus on the individual human agent and consider
how their cognitive states and processes might be extended by virtue of their
interactions with a surrounding nimbus of non-biological elements, the HEMC
concept encourages us to engage in something of a ‘mental flip’, wherein we focus
our attention on the way in which the cognitive capabilities of a machine-based
system (e.g., a cognitive computing platform) are realized, at least in part, by a
more-or-less permanent penumbra of human individuals.
Inasmuch as we accept the basic possibility of HEMC, we should obviously
consider the extent to which such forms of cognitive extension are materially
possible. Although it should be clear that nothing prevents important and
compelling cases of HEMC arising outside the socio-technical context of the
Internet,5 the Internet affords an environment that is particularly apt to support the
practical realization of HEMC-based systems. One reason for this concerns the
growth and popularity of the Internet. Crucially, the Internet has emerged as a major
part of the technological fabric associated with contemporary society. It is, as such,
a system that is used by an increasing proportion of the World’s population. The
result is that we can see the Internet as providing access to significant numbers of
cognitively-sophisticated processing units (i.e., individual human agents). Although
5 For example, we can imagine human biological brains beng incorporated into complex computational
tasks by virtue of the use of advanced brain activity recording devices or imaging techniques. The use of
such techniques in the context of rapid serial visual presentation tasks provides one example of such
forms of bio-technologically hybrid processing (see Huang et al. 2011).
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we might question the extent to which the elements of this large-scale social
environment are suitably poised to participate in episodes of machine-based
processing,6 what should not be in doubt is the fact that the Internet provides the
basis for large-scale forms of social participation in a variety of online tasks (see
Kraut et al. 2010). Indeed, existing work in the area of human computation (Law
and von Ahn 2011; Michelucci 2013) already attests to the possibility of
‘incorporating’ human individuals into bio-technologically hybrid processing loops.
There are a number of reasons why the HEMC concept is worthy of further
philosophical and cognitive scientific scrutiny. Firstly, the concept serves to bridge
two currently disparate areas of intellectual inquiry. One of these areas is, of course,
delineated by existing philosophical debates concerning the notions of extended
cognition and the extended mind. The other area emerges in relation to research on
Internet-enabled forms of human–machine cooperation (Smart and Shadbolt 2014;
Michelucci 2016). This includes, for example, a considerable body of work that has
emerged in relation to human computation systems (Law and von Ahn 2011;
Michelucci 2013) and citizen science platforms (Lintott and Reed 2013). Indeed,
when reading the literature on human computation, one sometimes encounters an
almost implicit reference to the idea of multiple (human) individuals serving as part
of the realization base for the processing capabilities a diverse array of emerging
socio-computational systems (see Michelucci 2016; Michelucci and Dickinson
2016). The HEMC concept provides a means of making this idea explicit while
simultaneously establishing an important point of conceptual contact with recent
work in the philosophy of mind (Clark 2008).
Another reason why the HEMC concept is important is because of its potential to
illuminate novel approaches to the implementation of intelligent systems. Perhaps
one of the most important considerations here relates to issues of complementarity.
It has long been recognized that one of the virtues of cognitive extension is its
ability to harness the complementary contributions of both biological and non-
biological resources (Sutton 2010; Wilson and Clark 2009). Wilson and Clark
(2009), for example, note the importance of extended cognition in yielding ‘‘hybrid
processes in which the inner and the outer contributions are typically highly distinct
in nature, yet deeply integrated and complementary’’ (p. 72). An appreciation of
such complementarity is, of course, also evident in much of the literature pertaining
to machine intelligence, especially work that goes under the heading of comple-
mentary computing (Kapoor et al. 2008), mixed-initiative systems (Horvitz 2007),
interactive machine learning (Fogarty et al. 2008) and heterotic computing (Kendon
et al. 2015). There is, however, a sense in which the notion of HEMC adds
6 There is, of course, an important issue hereabouts concerning the extent to which humans agents are
actually willing to participate in machine-based processing. The mere fact that almost everyone on the
planet can connect to the Internet does not mean that anyone will actually be ‘available’ for incorporation
into a particular information processing routine. Issues of incentivization and motivation are clearly
important here, as is the extent to which the temporal profile of human participation can be aligned with
the temporal demands of the target task. With respect to issues to timing, it is important to note that the
real-time recruitment and engagement of human participants into some form of information processing
activity is a topic that is the focus of current research in the human computation and crowdsourcing
communities. Research in this area typically goes under the heading of real-time or continuous
crowdsourcing (Lasecki and Bigham 2013).
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something new to this debate on complementarity. This is the idea—often
encountered in the extended mind literature—that the exploitation of complemen-
tary, bio-external resources may be of crucial relevance in accounting for some of
the more advanced aspects of human cognition. As Clark (2003) notes, ‘‘what is
special about human brains, and what best explains the distinctive features of human
intelligence, is precisely their ability to enter into deep and complex relationships
with non-biological, props, and aids’’ (p. 5). Such claims should encourage the
designers of intelligent systems to give serious thought to issues of hybridization
and complementarity. For inasmuch as human cognition is grounded in the ability to
assemble and exploit processing loops that extend across the brain, the body and the
world, then perhaps it is somewhat unfair to expect a system that trades in only one
kind of information processing economy (e.g., a connectionist or classical rule-and-
symbol processing regime) to achieve the kinds of cognitive success that we deem
to be representative of human-level intelligence. Put another way, if hybridization is
a fundamental feature of the human cognitive architecture, then perhaps our best
approach to engineering intelligent systems is to rely on solutions that factor in the
representational and computational contributions of elements that are drawn from
both the biological and non-biological domains. Just as advanced forms of human
intelligence are mostly (and possibly always) grounded in networks of bio-
artefactual and bio-technological coupling, so too perhaps the route to advanced
forms of machine intelligence lies in an ability to merge the modes of representation
and processing made available by both our biological brains and our current arsenal
of non-biological computing systems.
3 Embedded Cognition
According to those who embrace the notion of extended cognition, human cognitive
processes sometimes supervene on elements that lie outwith the biological borders
of the individual. This is clearly a somewhat radical-sounding proposal. A more
conservative view comes in the form of embedded cognition, which is championed
by the likes of Rupert (2004, 2009). In contrast to the idea that extra-organismic
elements play a constitutive role in the realization of cognitive states and processes,
Rupert suggests that we should see extra-organismic (or extra-agential) resources as
merely influencing inner, biologically-based(?) cognitive routines. This is not to say
that advocates of embedded cognition do not recognize the importance of extra-
organismic resources in shaping the course of cognitive processing. As Rupert
(2004) himself notes:
...cognitive processes depend very heavily, in hitherto unexpected ways, on
organismically external props and devices and on the structure of the external
environment in which cognition takes place. (p. 393)
As this quotation makes clear, proponents of embedded cognition are keen to
emphasize the way in which (human) cognitive states and processes depend on
aspects of the extra-organismic environment, even though they reject the claim that
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such resources should be seen as part of the physical fabric that realizes such states
and processes.
This is not the place to revisit arguments regarding the relative merits of extended
versus embedded conceptions of cognition (see Clark 2008, 2007a, 2010). What is
important, in the present context, is the extent to which the notion of embedded
cognition helps to improve our understanding of the space of possibilities
concerning the design and implementation of Internet-situated forms of machine
intelligence. In fact, as is noted by Clark (2008, p. 139), we should not see the
choice between embedded and extended cognition as a ‘‘zero-sum game.’’ Instead,
we should see the embedded and extended perspectives as conceptual lenses that are
‘‘apt to draw attention to certain features, regularities, and contributions while
making it harder to spot others or to give them their problem-solving due’’ (Clark
2008, p. 139). With this in mind, in what follows, I will attempt to highlight a
number of areas where I believe the embedded approach is to be preferred over the
extended alternative, specifically when it comes to issues of Internet-situated
machine intelligence.
One situation in which the human social environment plays an important role in
shaping the course of machine-based processing is to be found in the context of
collaborative filtering systems. Consider, for example, the approaches adopted by
companies such as Amazon and Netflix with regard to their product recommen-
dation systems. In both cases, there is a significant problem to be solved, namely,
the identification of those resources that might appeal to users based on their history
of purchasing behaviour. One approach to this problem is to engage in a detailed
analysis of each resource, attempting to judge the relative similarity of each
resource with respect to a number of dimensions of interest. This, it should be clear,
is a task that is of sufficient scale and complexity as to challenge the current state-
of-the-art in machine intelligence. The alternative approach is, of course, the one
embraced by both Amazon (Linden et al. 2003) and Netflix (Amatriain 2012):
simply monitor the purchasing behaviour of the relevant user community and rely
on the use of collaborative filtering techniques to make future product
recommendations.
What we encounter in the case of collaborative filtering, I suggest, is a situation
in which particular kinds of machine intelligence lean very heavily on the human
social environment. However, in this particular case, it does not seem appropriate to
regard the human social environment as an intrinsic part of the physical mechanisms
that realize the target task (i.e., the derivation of product recommendations). Instead,
it seems far more appropriate to see the human social environment as (e.g.)
generating representations that productively re-shape and re-configure the nature of
the computational problem that needs to be tackled by the technological system.
Examples of this sort of (socially-)embedded machine intelligence are, in fact,
relatively commonplace on the Internet. Google’s PageRank algorithm (Brin and
Page 1998), for example, which sits at the heart of its market-leading search
capability, is grounded in the linking behaviour of the Web user community: as
links accrue to particular resources, they provide an indication of the worth, interest
or value of those resources with respect to subsequent information retrieval
activities. In the absence of this sort of structural configuration and enrichment of
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the online environment, the PageRank algorithm would not be able to support the
ranking and sorting capabilities that are exhibited by the search engine. Similarly,
when it comes to judgments about the reliability of particular bodies of online
information, the endorsement activities of human users (in the form of, for example,
explicit user ratings) provides an important source of information that can be
factored into credibility evaluations (Taraborelli 2008).
The moral to emerge from these sorts of cases is that the human social
environment can often play an important (perhaps indispensable) role in enabling
some form of (synthetic) intelligent processing capability to emerge. Unlike the case
of HEMC, the human agents in these cases do not seem to be actively involved in
the realization of task-relevant information processing routines. Instead, they seem
to engage in a productive re-configuration or enrichment of the environment in
which machine-based processing occurs. Such a view is reminiscent of the claims
made by David Kirsh in respect of human problem-solving (Kirsh 1995, 2009).
Kirsh thus suggests that human agents engage in the active structuring of their
environments as a means of simplifying or transforming the nature of the problem
that confronts the biological brain. Something similar can perhaps be said to occur
in the aforementioned cases of product recommendation, resource ranking and
reliability evaluation. In such cases, the human social environment can be seen to
play a productive role in simplifying and transforming the kind of problem that
needs to be solved by some form of synthetic intelligent system. The nature of this
dependency, it should be clear, is significant. Absent the human contributions and
the performance of the machine-based system is likely to suffer as a result. Indeed,
in many cases, the nature of the computational task that confronts the machine-
based system is one that can only be achieved with the sort of support (deliberate or
otherwise) that is provided by the (Internet-using) human community.7
4 Scaffolded Cognition
Scaffolded cognition, as it name suggests, is a form of cognition in which an array
of extra-organismic elements are seen to play an important role in the development
of certain kinds of cognitive capability. The term has its roots in the developmental
psychology literature, most notably the work of the Soviet psychologist, Lev
Vygotsky (1986). Vygotsky’s contribution was to recognize the role played by
extra-organismic resources, especially the human social environment, in shaping the
developmental profile of a young human infant. The core idea was that the provision
of support at crucial points in the developmental trajectory of a young child would
eventually enable the child to achieve success in the absence of such support. The
support provided by an adult caregiver while a young infant takes her first few
faltering steps is one example of this sort of scaffolded development.
7 Note that the majority of human interactions with the Internet are not ones that are intended to support
machine cognition. Instead, in many cases, the support for machine cognition comes about as an indirect
result of our everyday interactions and engagements with the online environment.
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There is, of course, a certain sense in which scaffolded cognition appears similar
to both extended and embedded cognition. As with the notions of extended and
embedded cognition, scaffolded cognition is a form of cognition that is seen to rely
on a surrounding nexus of extra-organismic elements. What distinguishes scaffolded
cognition from both extended and embedded cognition, however, is the role played
by the extra-organismic elements in the development of cognitive capabilities. In the
case of scaffolded cognition, a supportive framework is erected around a developing
structure or capability in order to support its full emergence. Once the capability is
fully developed, the scaffolding is no longer required and can be dispensed with.
This, I suggest, marks an important point of difference between the notions of
scaffolded cognition on the one hand and the notions of extended and embedded
cognition on the other. In the case of scaffolded cognition, the environmental
resources are helping to alter and inform the development of a set of biologically-
based cognitive processing routines—routines that will, at some later stage, emerge
as free-standing. This is not something that the proponent of either extended or
embedded cognition needs to commit to. In the case of extended cognition, for
example, the function of bio-external resources is not to scaffold the development of
a biologically-based processing ability (although that may very well emerge as one
of the side-effects of some form of cognitively-potent bio-technological union);
neither is it to help bring about a future state-of-affairs in which the bio-external
resources are no longer required for the runtime realization of some form of
cognitive competence. Rather, the purpose of cognitively-potent bio-technological
mergers is often to give birth to a new kind of capability, one that is perhaps forever
beyond the developmental reach of the biologically-based cognizer.
Analogues to human-based forms of scaffolded cognition can, I suggest, be found
in the literature pertaining to Internet-situated machine intelligence. This is not, in
fact, as difficult as it might appear, for we have already seen how the Internet
provides the basis for ever-more intimate forms of cognitive contact with the human
social environment (see Sect. 2), and it is typically elements of the human social
environment (i.e., individual human agents) that provide the crucial forms of
support in the case of conventional (i.e., human-centered) forms of scaffolded
development (recall the role of human caregivers in supporting the infant’s early
ambulatory endeavors).8 What we are after in the case of machine-based scaffolded
cognition, therefore, is a state-of-affairs in which human agents are providing a form
of temporary support to the development of some ‘mature’ machine-based cognitive
capability. An example of this can be found, I suggest, in the literature on citizen
science systems (Lintott and Reed 2013). Consider, for example, a citizen science
system known as Galaxy Zoo. Galaxy Zoo is a system in which human participants
are asked to identify and classify galaxies based on images from the Sloan Digital
Sky Survey (Lintott et al. 2008). The basis for human involvement, in this case,
relates to the difficulty of identifying the taxonomically-relevant features of galaxies
from a set of 2D images. Recognizing that a particular galaxy is a spiral galaxy, for
8 This should not, of course, blind us to the possibility that machine intelligence might be scaffolded in
ways that do not involve human agents. There might, for example, be cases where the development of
machine-based cognitive capabilities is scaffolded by other kinds of technological system.
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example, requires an ability to detect an array of morphological features from a
complex (and highly variable) set of visual cues. Humans, as it turns out, are quite
good at this task, but the task presents something of a challenge for machine-based
vision systems. Progress in machine vision tasks often comes about as the result of
the application of machine learning techniques to large bodies of appropriately
labeled training data. In the case of many machine vision tasks, however, the
relevant body of training data is simply not available. The task of galaxy
classification is no exception here. But now notice something important: by virtue of
the classification efforts of human volunteers, the raw data for the galaxy
classification task (i.e., the set of 2D images) is altered. In place of a set of unlabeled
images, we now have a growing corpus of images that are reliably associated with
taxonomically-relevant labels. The availability of this ‘semantically-enriched’
dataset opens up a range of, previously unavailable, opportunities for machine-
based processing. One such opportunity is, of course, to exploit the annotated image
set in the context of machine learning techniques that aim to enhance the
performance of automated image classifiers. This is precisely the strategy adopted
by Dieleman et al. (2015). Dielemen et al. sought to apply a novel class of neural
networks, called deep convolutional neural networks, to the galaxy classification
task.9 Here, the availability of the training dataset, originating from the actions of
Galaxy Zoo volunteers, was instrumental in supporting the emergence of a novel
form of machine-based intelligent processing capability—one that we can (and
should) recognize as a genuine case of machine cognition, and one which (in my
view) also represents a bona fide case of scaffolded cognitive development.10
The importance of human contributions to the development of machine
intelligence is explicitly recognized by those who seek to incorporate human
subjects into computationally-difficult tasks. With respect to citizen science
systems, for example, Lintott and Reed (2013) note that one of the limiting factors
in the development of automated processing solutions is the availability of
sufficiently well-structured training datasets and that one of the key advantages of
citizen science projects is the provision of such datasets. Similarly, when it comes to
a class of systems known as Games With A Purpose (GWAP),11 von Ahn and
9 Convolutional neural networks are a form of deep learning architecture that is commonly used for
image processing tasks (Bengio 2009). Although not all deep learning architectures require appropriately
labeled training data, the Internet has clearly played an important role in securing access to the sort of
datasets that are typically used to train deep learning systems.
10 It should be clear, for example, that the human contributions are playing an important (and perhaps
indispensable) role in supporting the emergence of what is ultimately a free-standing capability. There is,
in addition, no reason why we should fail to recognize this as a genuine case of machine cognition. We
can thus ask ourselves whether the machine-based capability is one that we would be content to accept as
cognitive were it to be manifest by a human agent. The result, in this case, is surely positive. After all, the
task that is being performed by the machine vision system—i.e., morphological galaxy classification—is
more-or-less exactly the same task as that being performed by the human agents who generated the
training data. If we accept that classification outcomes in the human case are the result of a cognitive
ability, why should we regard the results of machine-based processing any differently?
11 GWAPs are computer games that are designed to make use of game player actions (von Ahn 2006;
Savage 2012; Cooper et al. 2010b). Often such games are used to support the process of scientific
discovery (Good and Su 2011; Khatib et al. 2011b). We thus encounter examples of GWAPs in the
Situating Machine Intelligence Within the Cognitive Ecology…
123
Dabbish (2008) are keen to stress the role of human contributions in giving rise to
ever-more intelligent forms of machine-based processing:
By leveraging the human time spent playing games online, GWAP game
developers are able to capture large sets of training data that express uniquely
human perceptual capabilities. This data can contribute to the goal of
developing computer programs and automated systems with advanced
perceptual or intelligence skills. (von Ahn and Dabbish 2008, p. 67)
In some cases, the machine-based elements can even play an active role in shaping
the course of their own cognitive development. They do this by soliciting particular
kinds of input from the human user community. A good example of this kind of
‘self-structured machine learning’ or ‘active learning’ (see Settles 2012) is a system
described by Barrington et al. (2012). The system in question uses a socially-
oriented online game, called Herd It, in which groups of human individuals annotate
a musical resource with descriptive tags. These annotations are subsequently used to
train a supervised machine learning system that ultimately aims to perform the
annotation task independently of the human agents. All this, of course, is broadly
consistent with the general profile of machine learning. But what makes Barrington
et al.’s system of particular interest is the way in which the machine directs the
course of its own learning. It does this by actively selecting the musical resources
that will be the focus of tagging efforts by the human game players. This is
important, because it gives the machine an opportunity to select those forms of
feedback that are likely to be of greatest value in terms of informing its subsequent
cognitive development. In the words of Barrington et al. (2012), ‘‘the machine
learning system actively directs the annotation games to collect new data that will
most benefit future model iterations’’ (p. 6411).
The cases of Galaxy Zoo and Herd It are thus compelling examples of how
human contributions can play an important, and perhaps indispensable, role in the
development of machine-based capabilities. Such cases should, I suggest, be viewed
as the machine-based counterparts of the more conventional cases of scaffolded
cognition that are discussed in the developmental psychology (Vygotsky 1986) and
cognitive science (Sterelny 2010) literatures.
The scaffolding of machine-based capabilities helps to highlight the transfor-
mative potential of the Internet with respect to the realization of new kinds of
machine cognition. In this respect, the conceptual value of scaffolded cognition is
similar to that identified in the case of extended cognition. In both cases, we are able
to see how the Internet enables the human social environment to extend the reach of
machine-based cognitive capabilities. In the case of extended cognition, the focus,
of course, is on the extent to which human agents can be incorporated into the
cognitively-relevant processing routines of a machine-based system. In view of the
current discussion of scaffolded cognition, however, it should be clear that the
transformative impact of the Internet is not exhausted by these sorts of intimate
Footnote 11 continued
domains of neuroscience (Marx 2013), proteomics (Cooper et al. 2010a), astronomy (Lintott et al. 2008),
and oncology (Coburn 2014).
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symbiotic cognitive unions. We can also now appreciate the role of online social
participation in shaping the developmental trajectory of (what are ultimately) free-
standing machine-based capabilities. Once we recognize this possibility, it
potentially alters the way that we approach the design and development of online
systems. Thus rather than simply designing systems with the aim of exploiting
human capabilities for the purposes of performing an otherwise intractable task, we
can also think about the way in which certain kinds of human inputs may function
as a form of cognitive scaffolding, working to enhance machine-based capabilities
to the point at which human input is no longer required. This, I suggest, is one of the
virtues of viewing the Internet through the conceptual lens of scaffolded cognition:
it enables us to review our approach to system design in the light of a new-found
appreciation of the sorts of opportunities the Internet provides for the development
of future forms of machine intelligence.12
5 Embodied Cognition
Issues of material embodiment and environmental embedding typically find their
greatest expression in an important and influential body of research that goes under
the heading of ‘embodied cognition’. Although there are a number of different
views as to what is implied by the term ‘embodied cognition’, a common feature of
embodied cognition research is the emphasis that is placed on extra-neural bodily
factors in shaping the course of cognitive processing (Anderson 2003; Shapiro
2007, 2011). Research into embodied cognition thus typically focuses on the way in
which an organism’s bodily structure or physical actions help to constrain (and
sometimes constitute) cognition. A somewhat trivial example is provided by the
way in which the placement of an organism’s sensory apparatus (e.g., the position of
their eyes and ears) helps to structure incoming sensory information in ways that
support perceptual processing (Webb 1996). Other forms of embodied cognition
research seek to evaluate the role of physical actions (e.g., hand gestures) in
supporting various forms of human cognitive competence (Goldin-Meadow 2003;
Goldin-Meadow and Beilock 2010; Cook et al. 2008; Andrade 2010).
In the case of biological agents, the body would seem to be a natural focus of
attention for those embracing a situated and ecologically-oriented approach to
cognition. But do any of the insights gleaned from embodied cognitive science have
any relevance to contemporary research on machine intelligence, especially when it
comes to the various species of intelligent system that inhabit the ecological niche
of the Internet?13
12 One example where we see evidence of this sort of influence is in the design of citizen science
systems. In the case of PenguinWatch (see https://www.penguinwatch.org/), for example, human vol-
unteers are required to identify the location of penguins in a set of images using a distinctive annotation.
Such annotations provide a form of additional structure that can be used to bolster the performance of
machine learning algorithms (Grant Miller, personal communication, February 24, 2016).
13 Claims about the importance of an embodied perspective in the case of other forms of intelligent
system should be largely uncontroversial. This is particularly so when it comes to the study of robotic
systems. Consider, for example, some of the early work in robotics where behavioral success was seen to
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One answer to this question comes from recent work on what is referred to as the
‘global brain’ (Heylighen 2013; Kyriazis 2015; Vidal 2015). The global brain, in
this case, is a metaphor for a form of planetary-scale superintelligence that is
‘‘formed by all people on this planet together with their artifacts and technologies’’
(Heylighen 2013, p. 905). The idea, in essence, is that global information and
communication networks, such as the contemporary Internet, serve as (part of) the
realization base for ‘‘problem-solving abilities...[that are] orders of magnitudes
larger than that of any single individual, organization, or computer system’’
(Heylighen 2013, p. 905). Crucially (although somewhat confusingly given their
appeal to neurological metaphors), global brain theorists accept the idea that
intelligence is constituted by more than just the operation of ‘brain-based’
processes. They thus accept the claim (which lies at the heart of the theoretical
agenda of embodied cognitive science) that corporeal elements can (and typically
will) play an important role in supporting the emergence of intelligent performances
(see Heylighen 2012). This much is clear from the way in which proponents of the
global brain talk about the contribution of human and technological elements to
‘embodied intelligence’:
The accelerating incorporation of a multitude of hardware sensors and
effectors (e.g. satellites, cameras, remote controls) together with an ever more
intimate individual-net interface turn the global brain into a truly situated and
embodied intelligence...Every human being or piece of machinery hooked up
to the web forms part of its body, providing it with additional capabilities for
input, output and control. (Heylighen 2012)
Here, then, we encounter one way in which issues of embodied cognition might be
able to establish a useful foothold in discussions relating to Internet-situated forms
of machine intelligence. The general idea is that, in at least some cases, it may be
appropriate to see technological devices (and perhaps even human agents) as literal
body parts, i.e., as physical elements that play the same sort of functional role—e.g.,
the mediation of real-world sensorimotor engagements—that we typically ascribe to
conventional (biological) body parts (see Clark 2007b). Inasmuch as such claims are
true, we are provided with an important opportunity to consider how issues of
embodiment might affect the attempt to engineer online forms of machine
intelligence. An important issue for future research is thus to determine whether
some of the insights gleaned from research into biological (and robotic) systems can
be applied to the realm of online systems and services. This, I suggest, should
attempt to go beyond the rather simple case of informational ‘pickup’, where some
Internet-accessible resource is used to provide a form of ‘perceptual’ contact with
the real-world environment.14 In fact, I suggest that the most compelling case for an
Footnote 13 continued
result from the exploitation of simple body-related sensorimotor contingencies. Clark’s (1999) description
of the can-collecting robot, Herbert, for example, highlights the role of bodily motion (in this case, the
rotation of the robot’s ‘torso’) in securing an appropriate physical alignment between the robot and a
target object—one that helps to secure the success of subsequent reaching movements.
14 Some examples derive from research into participatory sensing (Carrera et al. 2013; Resch 2013) and
collective sensing (Dugas et al. 2013; Ginsberg et al. 2009; Resch 2013). In the case of collective sensing,
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embodied cognitive science of Internet-situated machine intelligence is likely to
come about as a result of the attempt to allow machine-based systems to exert some
form of control over their ‘perceptual’ environments. One example might be the
case of sensor devices being actively moved and configured in order to structure the
flow of incoming sensory information. Another might be the case of human subjects
being actively recruited—perhaps via crowdsourcing techniques (Doan et al.
2011)—to engage in tasks that involve the transformation of problematic bodies
of target data (e.g., photorealistic images) into something more suitably aligned with
the idiosyncratic processing capabilities of a symbol-crunching computational
machine.15
6 Ecological Engineering
Throughout this paper, I have sought to draw on the idea that the Internet forms an
important part of the cognitive ecology for artificial cognitive systems. There are a
variety of reasons to think that this sort of ecological approach to the Internet is
useful, not least because it helps to support the kinds of analyses that were
undertaken in respect of extended, embedded, scaffolded and embodied cognition.
Now that these analyses have been undertaken, it is time to highlight an unexpected
bonus of the ecological perspective. This bonus comes into view once we pay
attention to the emphasis that is placed on the notions of ecological engineering
(Sterelny 2003) and cognitive niche construction (Clark 2008) in contemporary
cognitive science. The core idea, in brief, is that biological agents can sometimes
play an active role in creating and configuring their environments in ways that work
to structure, support and sustain their cognitive processing routines. In respect of the
notion of cognitive niche construction, for example, Clark (2008) suggests that we
should see cognitive niche construction as ‘‘the process by which animals build
physical structures that transform problem spaces in ways that aid (or sometimes
impede) thinking and reasoning about some target domain or domains’’ (p. 62).
Such processes are deemed to be important because they provide a powerful means
of bootstrapping certain kinds of cognitive capability. In the case of extended
Footnote 14 continued
for example, the inputs provided by human agents can sometimes be used to support the detection of
phenomena that are otherwise very difficult to discern. A notable example, in this case, concerns the use
of query-based syndromic surveillance techniques to monitor trends in disease pandemics. By monitoring
the prevalence of semantically-relevant Google search terms, it has thus proved possible to detect and
monitor the progress of influenza outbreaks (Dugas et al. 2013; Ginsberg et al. 2009). Similarly, the
analysis of online search behaviour has yielded insights into the seasonal nature of mental health concerns
(Ayers et al. 2013), as well as information about the side-effects of particular medicines (White et al.
2013).
15 Such human-mediated transformations of the target data could assume a variety of forms. One
example is provided by systems that support the (human-assisted) semantic annotation of complex
resources, such as medical X-ray images (see Rubin et al. 2008). These sorts of interventions are typically
aimed at improving machine-based access to important bodies of task-relevant information, many of
which are ‘hidden’ or ‘deeply embedded’ in the focal resource. Human annotations, in this case, help to
resolve what is sometimes referred to as the ‘semantic gap’ when it comes to the analysis of online
content (see Siorpaes and Simperl 2010).
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cognition, for example, we humans have the opportunity to create the very resources
that we subsequently assimilate into our cognitive processing routines. We thus
have to the ability to engage in an important form of cognitive ‘self-engineering’,
effectively creating the conditions under which we are able to the extend the reach
of our cognitive capabilities. ‘‘We use intelligence,’’ writes Clark, ‘‘to structure our
environment so that we can succeed with less intelligence. Our brains make the
world smart so that we can be dumb in peace!’’ (Clark 1997, p. 180).
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the notion of cognitive niche construction is just as
applicable to the realm of the online environment as it is to the realm of the offline
(or real-world) environment. This is particularly so once we consider the nature of
our interactions and engagements with the contemporary Internet. With the advent
of what is sometimes referred to as Web 2.0, we have witnessed a transition in the
way human agents interact with the Web. Thus, in addition to merely consuming
online content (as was the case with earlier versions of the Web), human Internet
users are now in a position to create and configure a significant amount of the
content that comprises the informational ecology of the online world. This is
perhaps most evident in the case of systems that are referred to as ‘social machines’
(Hendler and Berners-Lee 2010). These are systems that, according to Hendler and
Berners-Lee (2010, p. 156), enable the relevant user community to participate in the
creation and editing of online content. Wikipedia serves as one example of this class
of systems. In this case, the majority of the online content (i.e., the content of
Wikipedia articles) is contributed by members of the human user community.16
Other prominent examples include social networking systems, such as Facebook,
microblogging services, such as Twitter, and social media sites, such as YouTube
and Flickr. Inasmuch as these systems can be seen as part of the cognitive ecology
of the Internet, then it seems appropriate to see ourselves (both individually and
collectively) as engaged in a process of ‘online ecological engineering’ or ‘online
cognitive niche construction’, actively creating and configuring the environment
that influences the profile of our subsequent cognitive and epistemic endeavours.17
16 Note that even if the actual number of contributors (e.g., Wikipedia editors) is relatively small
compared to the total size of the relevant user community (e.g., the total number of individuals that access
Wikipedia), it is still true to say that much of the online content is being generated by the human ‘users’
of the system.
17 Part of this process, it should be clear, involves the design and development of the systems (e.g.,
Facebook) that we interact with whenever we go online. In this case, it seems that we play (at best) only a
minor role in the ‘engineering’ process, indirectly influencing design and development decisions via our
effect on market forces. There is, however, another sense in which we are poised to play a more active
and direct role in the process of online ecological engineering. This becomes clear when we reflect on the
way in which every form of human-Internet interaction is able to alter the informational content and
computational dynamics of the online environment. Thus every time we perform a Google Search, we
provide a body of data that can be used for a variety of purposes, for example, delivering personalized
search results (Simpson 2012) or implementing query-based syndromic surveillance systems (Dugas et al.
2013). The same applies to purchasing decisions on Amazon (recall the discussion of collaborative
filtering in Sect. 3). Thus every time we make a purchase using Amazon, we provide a form of data that is
poised to influence the kind of informational contact that both ourselves and others have with the online
environment. These examples help us see that our role as ecological engineers is not limited to the rather
straightforward case of (e.g.) editing a Wikipedia article or uploading a YouTube video. Instead, we can
(and should) think of even somewhat subtle forms of interaction and engagement with the online
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But it is not only human cognition that stands to be affected by this particular
form of ecological engineering. If the arguments rehearsed in this paper are
anywhere near the mark, then it becomes clear that we should see the actions of
human agents as not only altering the ecological setting for human intelligence but
as also affecting the environment in which various forms of machine intelligence
are materially embedded. We thus begin to creep up on an idea that first surfaced in
the discussion of scaffolded cognition (see Sect. 5). This is the idea that the Internet
affords a relatively unique opportunity for the global human community to create
the sorts of conditions under which advanced forms of machine intelligence might
emerge. Contrary to any radical sea-change in our approach to machine learning, or
some dramatic breakthrough in our understanding of the mechanistic origins of
intelligent behavior, perhaps what is really required to advance the state-of-the-art
in machine intelligence is merely(!) a means of creating the sort of ecological niche
that enables machine-based cognitive systems to thrive and flourish. Our online
interactions, if this is correct, might be seen as a means of progressively shaping
(and re-shaping) the specific mix of opportunities and affordances that help to bring
the next generation of cognitive computing systems into being.
If this all seems somewhat vague, perhaps it will help to consider a concrete
example of how human activity, when appropriately supported and enabled by the
technological infrastructure of the Internet, can lead to advances in machine
intelligence. Take IBM Watson, the poster child of the emerging cognitive
computing paradigm (Kelly and Hamm 2013). Watson’s virtuoso performance in
answering of array of difficult questions is undoubtedly an important demonstration
of the growing sophistication of machine-based processing, especially in the areas
of natural language processing, machine learning and domain-specific reasoning. In
the course of being awestruck by (at least some of) Watson’s outputs, however, it is
easy to overlook the simple fact that many of the inputs to the system—especially
the information resources that Watson exploits in supplying its human interlocutors
with answers—are ones that are, in general, developed by large numbers of human
individuals. Such resources include online encyclopedias, dictionaries, thesauri,
taxonomies, ontologies and so on (Ferrucci et al. 2010). None of these resources, it
should be clear, were specifically intended to support Watson, or indeed any of the
other cognitive computing systems that are the focus of current research interest.
Rather, what has happened is that as a result of the Internet’s ability to support and
solicit online engagement we now have access to an array of resources that can be
used to fuel the development of relatively novel forms of machine intelligence. If
such systems—I am thinking primarily of Watson here—had appeared in the
absence of the Internet, we would, I suspect, have been astonished at their
capabilities. And yet Watson is, at root, exactly the same kind of symbol
manipulating device that has long been the focus of philosophical theorizing and the
primary instrument of cognitive scientific practice. Arguably, what has changed in
recent times is not so much the underlying technology, as the nature of the
Footnote 17 continued
environment (e.g., watching a YouTube video) as constituting a cognitively- and epistemically-potent
form of online ecological engineering.
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environment in which such technologies are situated. The Internet has thus enabled
us to create the sort of environment in which a conventional symbol crunching
computational economy is able to exhibit forms of intelligence that might have
seemed utterly out of reach just a few short years ago.
The key take home message of this section is that it sometimes makes sense to
see intelligence as (in part) a product of the environment in which an agent is
materially embedded. Inasmuch as this is true, and inasmuch as it applies to the case
of machine intelligence, then it clearly makes sense to see issues of environmental
structuring, enrichment and configuration as of crucial importance to the enhance-
ment of machine-based cognitive capabilities. Given that the human-engineered
environment is deemed to be of crucial relevance to our own human cognitive
capabilities (Clark 2003, 2008), why not assume that the key to advanced forms of
machine intelligence is likewise to be found in an environment that is home to a
growing number of our intelligent machines?
7 Conclusion
In the present paper, I suggested that we should view the Internet as a form of
cognitive ecology. The primary value of this perspective is that it helps us gain a
better understanding of how the Internet might shape and influence the profile of
machine-based cognitive capabilities, both now and in the future. The idea that the
Internet forms part of the cognitive ecology for machine intelligence also brings a
range of other benefits. For example, it enables us to establish a useful point of
contact with work that emphasizes an ecological approach to human cognition
(Hutchins 2010; Malafouris 2013; Tribble and Sutton 2011; Bateson 1972). It
should also be clear that an ecological approach enables us to take a number of
different conceptual stances when it comes to an analysis of the cognitive
significance of the Internet. We can thus view the Internet from the perspective of
those approaches that are typically associated with the situated cognition movement,
e.g., extended, embedded, scaffolded and embodied cognition (see Robbins and
Aydede 2009b). When we apply this situated perspective to the case of Internet-
based forms of machine intelligence, a number of interesting and important issues
come to light. These include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following:
• Philosophical issues As we saw in the discussion of HEMC (see Sect. 2), a
situated approach to machine intelligence can help to reshape and reorient the
trajectory of existing philosophical debates. When it comes to extended
cognition, for example, much of the philosophical discourse is based around the
idea of human-centered—or organism-centered (see Clark 2008)—cognition. By
applying the notion of extended cognition to the realm of machine intelligence,
we help to broaden the philosophical debate and (hopefully) instigate new forms
of philosophical progress.
• Engineering issues A situated approach is also useful in helping to inform the
design and development of online systems. We saw, for example, that manually
annotated resources can sometimes be used to support the development of fully
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automated capabilities (see Sect. 4). Once we appreciate this possibility, it
potentially alters the way that we approach the design and development of future
systems.
• Cognitive science issues In the context of the discussion on collaborative
filtering (see Sect. 3), we encountered the idea that the human social
environment could be exploited as a form of computationally-significant
resource. This is an idea that seems to be gaining increasing traction within the
computer science community (Bernstein et al. 2012; Robertson and Giunchiglia
2013). In the extreme case, we can perhaps see the Internet as transforming the
human social environment into something of a ‘social computer’—a large scale
socio-computational system that is able to shape, support and sustain the next
generation of AI systems.
• Ethical issues Once we recognize the role of human-Internet interactions in the
development and operation of machine-based cognitive processing routines, a
number of important ethical issues start to come to light. Such issues are
particularly apparent if we accept that human agents can form part of the
physical machinery that realizes machine-based cognitive processes (see
Sect. 2). In this case, it is natural to wonder whether the support for machine
cognition is predicated on a form of technological control reminiscent of that
exerted by the factory-based machines of the Industrial Era (see Black 2014).
There is also an important issue hereabouts concerning the extent to which it is
appropriate for human agents to be incorporated into processes that they
themselves might regard as ethically unacceptable.
• Economic issues On a somewhat related note, many of our contributions to the
online cognitive ecology are seldom subject to financial remuneration. This
raises an important issue concerning the extent to which the (financial)
beneficiaries of machine-based cognitive systems (e.g., major technology
vendors) should be allowed to capitalize on what is, in effect, a form of unpaid
‘digital labour’.
As should be clear from this list, the kinds of issues raised by the present paper
reach well-beyond the disciplinary borders of cognitive science. We can thus begin
to see how a situated approach to machine intelligence, in conjunction with a
cognitive ecological approach to the Internet, helps to bring an important array of
issues into the scientific, social, philosophical and engineering spotlight.
From a purely cognitive science perspective, the primary value of viewing the
Internet as a form of cognitive ecology is that it helps us to appreciate the
transformative potential of the Internet vis-a`-vis future forms of (human and)
machine intelligence. Given the way in which an ecological perspective encourages
us to see cognition as heavily dependent on, if not partly constituted by, aspects of
the wider environment, we can view the Internet as marking a potentially significant
waypoint in the ‘evolution’ of machine-based capabilities. We have seen, for
example, how the Internet provides an unprecedented opportunity to tap into human
capabilities in a manner and on a scale that would have been unthinkable just a
couple of decades ago (see Sect. 2). We have also encountered the idea that the
Internet provides access to a variety of kinds of training data that are progressively
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altering our traditional approaches to machine learning (see Sect. 4). Finally, we
have seen how the Internet affords access to bodies of information that can be used
to develop intelligent systems whose capabilities are, at least in some respects,
superior to those of their human counterparts (recall the discussion of IBM Watson
in Sect. 6).
The advent of the Internet thus marks a potentially important milestone in our
attempts to engineer future forms of machine intelligence. In helping us to press
maximal cognitive benefit from this new environment, we should, I suggest, seek to
establish intellectual contact with work in the philosophy of mind that aims to
illuminate the ways in which human cognition is influenced by an array of extra-
neural and extra-organismic resources. Such points of contact may be invaluable in
terms of helping us to appreciate the many ways in which the Internet helps to shape
the intelligence of both ourselves and the machines we build.
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